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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J' 1Ht: <~!,LL anrl CLARK JENKINS, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH, 
Defendant-Respondent 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 19186 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 35, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, the Defendant-Respondent petitions the 
Court for a rehearing in the above-entitled matter. In its 
decision, filed July 23, 1986, [hereinafter referred to as Call 
III], the Court ei:red in the following particulai:s: 
1. The decision creates new rules concei:ning the 
"law of the case", the pi:actical effect of which will 
"logjam" both trial and appellate courts. 
2. The decision deprives the Defendant-Respondent of 
an oppoi:tunity to present its full case in "defense" 
of the validity of its Ordinance and the impact fee 
assessed thereunder. 
3. The decision impi:operly adjudicates the validity 
of the Oi:dinance BEFORE the defendant was allowed to 
present its side of the case. 
4. The decision authoi:izes the Plaintiff to assert 
new claims, while denying to the Defendant the 
opportunity to assei:t the appropriate "defenses" 
against those claims. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The relevant facts are contained in thP .,r1q1nal Rrief of 
Respondent. The trial court's Finc11n•J of F.1ct arµ included as an 
appendix to the original Brief of Resp.indent. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE DECISION UNINTENDEDLY ABOLISHES 
THE •LAW OF THE CASE" DOCTRINE 
BY ALLOWING TO BE RAISED 
CLAIMS WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED EARLIER 
AND WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED BY THE 
COURT'S PREVIOUS DECISIONS 
This action---as originally filed in 1978---alleged the 
invalidity and unconstitutionality of the West Jordan flood 
control and parks impact fee ordinance [hereinafter "the 
Ordinance"]. This Court originally decided the Plaintiffs' 
claims adversely to Plaintiffs by holding that the Ordinance was 
facially "constitutional" and "valid". Call VS City of West 
Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) [hereinafter Call I]. 
Thereafter, the Plaintiffs applied for a rehearing. They 
asserted that the impact fee ordinance was unconstitutional "as 
applied". 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980) [hereinafter Call II]. This 
Court stated: 
While we agree that the ordinance is not 
constitutional on its face, plaintiffs raise question 
as to its constitutionality as applied to them which 
make disposition of this issue as a matter of law 
inappropriate. 
614 P.2d at 1258. Emphasis added. This Court concluded: 
In this case the rule adopted by this Cnurt in 
Call I, quoted ante, cannot be applied w1tho11t 
plaintiffs being given the opportunity to present 
evidence to show that the dedication required of them 
had no reasonable relationship to the n•'P•ls f·ir fl•)•Jd 
control or parks anrl r1?creat1 'n fac1litiec; crPetted hj 
their subdivision, if c:n'.J. Implicit in this rule> ic; 
the requirement that if the subdivision generates such 
neerls and West Jordan exacts the fee in lieu of 
dedication, it is only fair that the fee so collected 
be used in such a way as to benefit demonstrably the 
subdivision in question. This is not to say that the 
benefit must be solely to the particular subdivision, 
but only that there be some demonstrable benefit to 
it . 
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. No costs awarded. 
614 P.2d at 1259. Emphasis added. 
This Court could have been not more clear as to the limited 
issues to be considered in further proceedings. One year later 
in Banberry Development Corporation vs City of South Jordan, 631 
P.2d 899 (Utah 1981 ), this Court wrote: 
In Call vs City of West Jordan, Utah, 606 P.2d 
217 (1979), opinion on rehearing, 614 P.2d (1980), 
this Court upheld the validity of a city ordinance 
that required subdividers, as a condition of plat 
approval, to dedicate certain proposed subdivision 
land to the city (or pay cash in lieu) for flood 
control and/or park and recreation facilities. In 
remanding the case for trial on the constitutionality 
of the ordinance as applied (i.e., the requirement 
that seven percent of the subdivision land be 
dedicated), this Court ruled that "the dedication 
should have some reasonable relationship to the need 
created by the subdivision." 
631 P.2d at 905. Emphasis added. 
In March 1981 the Plaintiffs moved to amend their 
complaint. The Defendant, asserting that the issues remaining in 
this case were limited to the "reasonableness" of the impact 
fee, vigoriously opposed the amendment. Defendant's "Answer" (to 
the amenderl complaint) states: 
Defendant asserts the material issues covered the 
alleaations contained in paragraph 29 through 48 have 
already been decided adversely to the Plaintiff in the 
~emorandum Decision of the District Court on May 21 
1978, and in the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court 
(filed December 26, 1979, petition for rehearing, June 
27, 1980). The inclusion of said allegations and the 
attendant expansion of Plaintiff's alleged claims 
violate the Order of the Supreme Court limiting the 
issues to be presented at trial. 
Paraqraph 8. 
Notwithstanding these ob1ections, the amendment was qranted 
by Judge Sawaya of the District Court. However, when the case 
was finally tried before Judge Dee of the D1str1ct Court, tr. 
Plaintiffs presented no evidence on any of the expanded issues. 
At the conclusion of the presentation the Plaintiffs' evidence 
AND BEFORE THE CITY PRESENTED ITS CASE IN CHIEF, Judge Dee 
correctly ruled that the Plaintiffs had failed in their buraen 
of proof. Judge Dee specifically found no "unreasonableness" in 
the impact fee. 
Now, some eight years after the litigation was filed, this 
Court has ruled that the Plaintiff can expand the issues. The 
Court now writes: 
Althouqh west Jordan does not cross-appeal the 
allowance of the amendment, it urges this Court to 
limit the case to the constitutional "reasonableness" 
issue. However, the pleadings may be amended after 
remand within the sound discretion of the trial court 
so long as they do not cover issues specifically 
foreclosed by the appellate court. 
The foregoing statements (from Call II and Banberry) as to the 
limited issues on remand clearly indicate that "reasonableness" 
issue was THE SOLE ISSUE to be decided. The nature of the 
original action (declaratory judgment concerning the validity of 
the ordinance) and the Supreme Court's approval of the facial 
validity of that ordinance should have "foreclosed" all issues 
other than the "reasonableness" of the impact fee---at least for 
this case filed by these Plaintiffs. THE PLAINTIFFS SHOULD NOT 
BE ALLOWED TO TAKE SUCCESSIVE "BITES AT THE APPLE". 
There was no need for the City to cross-appeal. 
Sawaya's ruling allowing the amended complaint 1-1as n"t a final 
order, from which an aopeal c'>uld he taken. Th•0 re was nu ad·;prse 
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1 nr'·"·t "'''r<11 n-1 t•J th"' C 1 ty, as Judge Dee had specifically found 
triat tl,P •'it/ ha"i "ield a public hearing in compliance with the 
I •w. This ;rPc1f ic finding rendered moot any appeal by the City 
1n~'r,rn 1 nr:i th lS "npw" claim. 
The doctrine of "the law of the case" ought to limit the 
rnurt's decision in this regard. 
WHAT ATTORNEY---ESPECIALLY AN ATTORNEY WHO JUST "LOST" ON 
HIS CLAIMED INVALIDITY OF AN ORDINANCE IN AN APPEAL OF A 
D~CLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION---WOULDN'T LIKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
"POLISH" HIS PLEADINGS A LITTLE BY ADDING NEW CAUSES OF ACTION? 
Rather than rewarding slopping pleadings and the "reservation" 
of claims, this Court should encourage judicial economy--
-especially in "declaratory judgment actions" where the facts 
really are not in dispute and where, as in this case, the matter 
(the validity of AN ordinance) can be adjudicated at the summary 
judgment stage! 
The Court should be concerned by the fact that the 
Plaintiffs' initial claims were to the effect that there was NO 
cNABLING LEGISLATION authorizing the Ordinance. [See the First 
Cause of Action of the orioinal complaint.] 1 Now, AFTER the 
Plaintiffs lost in Supreme Court in Call I, they claim that 
there WAS ENABLING LEGISLATION, but that West Jordan didn't 
follow the statute. 
Plaintiffs' <Jnq1nal claims that the ordinance was an invalid "tax" for 
which t•wre ·..ias no enabling legislation [Third Cause of Action] and that 
t'.1e rh'<licat ion nf land or money required under the Ordinance constituted an 
1uwonst1tutinnal "takinq nf ornpPrt:: without just compensation" [Second 
, .1us•', d '"'\ i<>nl •,,r0re sim1l1rl·.: .iec1ded adversely to the Plaintiffs. Call 
I. 
Th e b r o ad 1 3 n ,3 'J a q P Call I I I 
subordinate courts to cont1nuP tn ">-1\ 1 i" 
reserve", rather than pl~ad1nJ f''.'•·t I ill. 
our legal system is w,1stef,Jl, t \) t : : l' '' :~ t_J l r l t '' 
modern i u r l s pr u den c P a n d .... --- { > ri t r 3. < 1 i ,_" t :? t r, ~ R u 1 e .-.:.. , > f ,= i 1 .1 i l 
Procedure. 
Rather than limitina the issues to he decided, Call III has 
now expanded the issues. This is particularly aqqravating since 
the claim was oriainally filed as 
claim. The Plaintiff should put in 
a "declaratory judgment" 
their case ALL OF THEIR 
CLAIMS as to the invalidity of an ordinance. The decision in 
Call III rewards the Plaintiffs for sloppy pleading and allows 
them to take "successive bites at the apple" after their appeal 
is decided adversely to them in the first instance. 
The Court's decision in Call III says to attorneys and to 
subordinate judges: "It doesn't matter what the Supreme Court 
says. Our decisions mean nothing and the factors limiting the 
case and the decision are not to be honored." The Supreme Court 
ought to say what it means and mean what it says. Certainly the 
Court cannot expect subordinate 
and follow its rulinas [i.e. 
judges and attorneys to honor 
"re!l'anded for trial on a 
'constitutionality as applied' issue with "reasonableness" (of 
the impact fee) the dispositive factnrl lf it fails to do so. 
Call III, as presently written, constit~tes aut~oritv to ignnre 
the Court's rulinas enc0ur3aes 3 t torn.:::«' s f i 1 "° 
h a 1 f - h e a r t e d p 1 e a d i n a s , " r, o 1 a i n ,~ h a c k " 'n " s 1 e e p er " c au s P s ,~ f 
action. 
II 
THE COURT'S PRESENT ADJUDICATION ON THE 
MERITS OF THE ORDINANCE IS PREMATURE 
AND UNFAIR TO THE DEFENDANT, WHICH HAS 
BEEN DEPRIVED OF AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT 
ITS DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS 
At the conclusion of the presentation of Plaintiffs' 
~ase-in-chief, Judge Dee of the district court ruled that the 
Plaintiffs failed to prove by preponderance of the evidence that 
the impact fee assessed against them was "unreasonable". The 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO PRESENT ITS "CASE-IN-CHIEF" TO 
DEFEND AGAINST PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATIONS. This ruling precluded 
the Defendants from an opportunity to present its full defense. 
The testimony presented by the Defendant concerning the 
public hearing was merely in compliance with the Court's 
pre-trial order. That evidence was not necessarily a complete 
presentation of the Defendant's case. Judge Dee ruled 
repeatedly that the Defendant had complied with the pre-trial 
order. The trial court is in a much better advantage to the 
position to determine the compliance with the court order yet 
this Court rules on the basis. Nevertheless, the Court now holds 
"as a matter of law", that the City failed to comply with the 
district court's pre-trial order. 
It is patently unfair to decide at this level and at this 
late stage in the litigation to hold that the City has, as "a 
10ettPr of law", faile>rl to sustain the burdens imposed upon it by 
•'~"~ d1str1ct court's pre-trial order. The district court 
rc'r'e3tedly ruled that the City we had complied with its 
'rP-r r 1 al order. Judge Dee stated: 
have already ruled on the question whether I 
t'.1''"'1h.• he's complied with Judge Rigtrup's order, and 
I think he has, 
Record at 1711-1712. Emphasis added. 
To hold---on the basis of the limited evidence presented 
merely in compliance with the trial court's pre-tr1a: 
order---that the Ordinance is invalid, is unfair. The City 
should have the opportunity to make a complete showing as to the 
holding of the public hearing. 
In Call III the Court now writes: 
Although the statute does not specifically address the 
required notice, we hold that the because the statute 
calls for a public hearing our legislature 
contemplated something more than a regular city 
council meeting held, so far as the record here 
discloses, without specific advance notice to the 
public that the proposed ordinance would be 
considered. Notice, to be effective, must alert the 
public to the nature and scope of the ordinance that 
is finally adopted •. 
Citations to cases omitted. The Court correctly notes that the 
statute does not specifically address any required notice. 
However, the Court indicates that the public was not put on 
notice that the ordinance would not be adopted. This is 
incorrect. 
The record---on the basis of the limited evidence---does 
show that prior to the adoption of the impact fee ordinance in 
1975 the public was notified. [Because of the trial court's 
dismissal of Plaintiff's claims, the Defendant was not required 
to present any evidence as to the meeting at which the ordinance 
was actually adopted.] Because the City only presented a 
limited amount of evidence in compliance with the district 
court's pre-trial order, there was no necessity to provide the 
agenda for the January 1975 City Council meeting. Furthermore, 
8 
even 1 f there was an advance public notice, the agenda may long 
have been destroyed. [This particular item is significant, as 
disc11ssed in the issues outlined in Point III.D below.] 
The Court notes that there is no statutory requirement of _ 
advance notice but nevertheless holds that the "statute calls 
for a public hearing" and implies that the "legislature 
contemplated something more than a regular city council meeting" 
be held. This, however, does not give any guidance as to what 
is specifically required. Is advance public notice of the 
public hearing required? If so, why did not Legislature say so? 
Certainly this fact must be contrasted with the public notice 
requirements contained in other statutes. See, for example, 
§10-9-5: fifteen days advance notice and publication in a 
newspaper required for zoning ordinance amendments; §10-2-414: 
twenty days advance not ice and publication in a newspaper 
required before annexations can be effected, 10-2-414, Utah 
Code. Section 11-23-7 requires a "public hearing" before a 
special service district can be created, but Section 11-23-8 
requires extensive publication of notice in a newspaper. 
Admittedly, the Legislature may have intended to required 
"more than a regular city council meeting." But in Section 
10-9-25, the Legislature obviously did not necessary intend that 
"published notice" be required. Had the Legislature intended as 
much, it could have easily said so---as it did in these other 
provisions. The Legislature didn't say so, so it must have 
intended that there could be LESS (than "published notice"). 
Thus, if the Court is expecting the City to come forth with a 
"proof of publicication" affidavit, that is a requirement not 
necessarily contemplated by the statute. 
Furthermore, the Court's rulinq l<]nc•res tr<e PV!Clence. 
First, there was direct testimony by Glen Mnosman---a city 
councilman who ATTENDED THE MEETING---that a "puld1c hear1n·i" 
was held. [This must be contrasted with the total absence ot 
evidence to the contrary.] Secondly, the hearing was held in the 
auditorium of a local school---NOT THE CITY COUNCIL'S CHAMBERS, 
which would be the regular place of meeting. Thirdly, there must 
have been some kind of "notice" given, so as to alert people to 
the meeting---if only as to the change of location. Fourthly, 
citizens---includinq Developers---appeared at the hearing. 
Fifthly, those in attendance were given the opportunity to 
speak: a public "hearing"! And lastly, the Ordinance was not 
adopted until a considerable time later. Obviously, the 
Ordinance was not "hustled through" the legislative process 
without the opportunity for public input. 
Of particular concern for the Court should be the fact that 
the Plaintiffs themselves have NOT claimed they were deprived of 
an opportunity for public input---arguably granted by §10-9-25. 
The Plaintiffs' land wasn't even within the city limits at the 
time. 
If the Court is inclined to state that the Legislature 
"contemplated something more than a regular city council 
meeting, the Court should say what that specific requirement is. 
As the Court correctly notes, the record does not disclose that 
advance notice was given. This is because the City---hy reason 
of the trial court's ruling---was not able to present its 
complete case in defense case-in-chief. This Court should 
remand the case for the presentation for such evidence. 
10 
Purthermnre, the Court's present decision ignores the 
Pv1dence that the Planning and Zoning Commission had required 
thP "dedication" of land (parks and open space) as a condition 
of development approval beginning in early 1974. When the -
legality of such was questioned, an ordinance was prepared and 
the matter was referred to the City Council. The "public 
hearing" was held in August 1974. The ordinance was finally 
adopted in January 1975. 
This is not the case where the City Council---as a 
"quickie" and without notice to anyone---decides to adopt an 
ordinance. The public did have an opportunity for input! On 
several occasions. 
What is particularly aggravating in the case at bar is that 
this case is not presented as one where THESE DEVELOPERS are 
claiming they were deprived of the opportunity for input into 
the decision on the impact fee. These developers weren't even 
around at the time of the adoption of the ordinance. The 
property they developed was not even within the city limits at 
the time of the adoption of the ordinance. [The territory for 
the Wescall subdivision was annexed in early 1977---two years 
APTER the adoption of the impact fee ordinance.] 
The Plaintiffs should be estopped from asserting an 
invalidity to this ordinance. They have never made any claim 
whatsoever that they were personally deprived in any fashion 
from giving the West Jordan City Council any input. 
III 
THE COURT'S EXPANSION OF THE ISSUES 
BEYOND THE "REASONABLENESS" OF THE IMPACT FEE ISSUE 
JUSTIPIES THE DEFENDANT TO ASSERT ADDITIONAL DEFENSES 
ABOVE THE MERE REASONABLENESS OF THE IMPACT FEE 
11 
If the Court allows the expansion •1f issu<'.; t<> 1n·-·3l 1datP 
the ordinance beyond a "reasonableness" issue, ti,.., '<•urt sh•,ul 1 
likewise allow the Plaintiffs to "amend" its answPc tu 1ncl11rl0 
defenses which would address defenses to the Plaintiffs' claims 
going beyond the "reasonableness" issue. 
A. The "estoppel" defense. 
The Plaintiffs should be estopped from asserting the 
invalidity of the ordinance for anything other than 
"unreasonableness". The estoppel arises by reason of the fact 
that the Plaintiffs at the time the ordinance was adopted owned 
land (if they owned it at all at the time) outside of the city 
limits! Because they needed to come to the City to obtain 
municipal services for the subdivision they were intending to 
build and to make their development profitable and sellable, 
they petitioned for annexation. Following the annexation into 
the City, they obtained development approval and paid the impact 
fee. [It is questionable whether the fee was at that time even 
paid "under protest". The "protest" did not come until after 
the development had been approved, the fee paid and work beoun.J 
The Plaintiffs built the subdivision and created the impact 
(concerning parks and recreation areas and flood-control which 
the Planning and Zoning Commission generally found, the City 
Council found, which this Court recognized in its decision in 
Call I and which THE TRIAL COURT SPECIFICALLY FOUND! Thereaft~r 
the lawsuit was filed. The Plaintiffs lost on the merits as to 
the constitutionality and invalidity of the ordinance. Call I. 
Then, FOUR YEARS LATER and some six years after the orrl1nance is 
passed, they claim that the ordinance is invalid. Pet1t1nn1no 
for annexation, accepting the builrling and rlr,,;Pl·'i''"nnt a1·1·rr·.val 
12 
and ,,i,1ci1n1w~ U·,e services and the benefits of being in the 
mu1•1,·q,c:il rt·; certLi1nl/ ought to bar the Plaintiffs at this late 
~t .-iqP •Jt tl1e qame FROM raising the issue of non-compliance with 
the statute. 
If they had filed the lawsuit BEFORE they had built the 
subdivision, BEFORE they had paid the fee, BEFORE they had 
created the impact, declaratory judqment in their favor may be 
appropriate. But to create the impact and then ask to get the 
money back under the basis that the ordinance was void ab initio 
is patently unfair. They ought to be estopped. Certainly the 
petition for annexation ought to be an implicit agreement to 
abide by the "rules of the game" to which they (through the 
annexation) have invited themselves---rather than challenging 
the rules after the "game" is over. 
B. The "unjust enrichment" defense. 
The Plaintiffs created the impact the fee was designed to 
address. That impact was determined and found by the trial 
court. To have the Plaintiffs have an economic benefit of 
development and to not required to install the flood-control and 
parks facilities which they would have had to install but for 
which they paid the fee, would constitute an unjust enrichment. 
Surely the Court ouaht to remand the case for the adjudication 
•)f this issue and an opportunity for the Defendants to present 
its case on this issue. 
The "mistake" defense. 
A similar "defense" arises in that if the City would have 
known the ordinance was "void ab initio" (as now declared by the 
Cnurt), the C1tv would not have allowed the Developers to create 
U10 1mp1,·t tt1c>« ,·reated; thP developers themselves would have 
had to install the parks and flood-control lac1lities. 
Obviously, a "mistake" was made by the City (1n assuming the 
validity of the ordinance). Certainly, the develupers should be 
estopped from recovery, which would be an unJuSt eni ichrnent, by 
reason of this mistake. 
D. Statute of limitation defenses. 
The allowance of the filing (1n 1981---SIX YEARS after the 
adoption of the Ordinance and almost FOUR years after the 
litigation was originally filed) of "new" claims (unrelated to 
the claims originally pleaded and decided by this Court in Call 
I and other than the "reasonableness" issue) raises "statute of 
limitation" defenses, which the City should now be allowed to 
present. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reconsider its decision and limit its 
review to the issue of "reasonableness", as determined by the 
Call II decision. The trial court's finding as to the 
"reasonableness" of the impact fee assessed against the 
Plaintiffs should be upheld. Judge Dee correctly applied the 
law---as established by this Court in Call II---to the case; his 
decision should be upheld. 
Plaintiffs by reason of 
reinstated. 
The judgment entered against the 
their failure of proof should be 
If the Court is still inclined to now allow the Plaintiff 
to pursue legal 
(reasonableness)" 
theories beyond the 
theory [hastily adopted 
14 
11 as 
only 
applied 
after the 
Plaintiffs hacl 10st in Call I], the Court should allow the 
Defenclant an opportunity to present the appropriate "defenses" 
tu those newly-allowed claims. 
The trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims at the 
conclusion of the presentation of Plaintiffs' evidence deprived 
the Defendant of the opportunity to present its "defense". 
Before the Court can rule on the validity of the ordinance in 
its entirety, all the evidence---including the complete 
"defense" evidence, not merely evidence to comply with the trial 
court's pre-trial order---should be heard. Unless the trial 
court's judgment is affirmed, the case should be remanded to the 
trial court to give the Defendant an opportunity to present its 
"case in chief". 
The undersigned certifies that this Petition for Rehearing 
is presented in good faith and not for the purpose of delay. 
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of August, 1986. 
~~ 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I hand-delived four copies of the foregoing 
CORRECTED PETITION FOR REHEARING to the office of Mr Robert J 
DeBry, Attorney at Law, 4252 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84107, this 12th day of Auqust, 1986. 
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